We prove a general possibility result for collective decision problems where individual allocations are one-dimensional, preferences are single-peaked (strictly convex), and feasible allocation profiles cover a closed convex set. Special cases include the celebrated median voter theorem (Black 1948, Dummett and Farquharson 1961) and the division of a nondisposable commodity by the uniform rationing rule (Sprumont 1991).
Introduction and the punchline
Single-peaked preferences played an important role in the birth of social choice theory and mechanism design. Black observed in 1948 that the majority relation is transitive when candidates are aligned and preferences are single-peaked (Black 1948) : this result inspired Arrow to develop the social choice approach with arbitrary preferences. Dummett and Farquharson noted in 1961 that the median peak (the majority winner) defines an incentive compatible voting rule (Dummett and Farquharson 1961) ; they also conjectured that no voting rule is incentive compatible under general preferences, which was proven true 12 years later by Gibbard and by Satterthwaite (Gibbard 1973 , Satterthwaite 1975 .
Two decades and many more impossibility theorems later, single-peaked preferences reappeared in the problem of allocating a single nondisposable commodity (e.g., a workload) when the aggregate demand may be above or below the amount to be divided. Inspired by Benassy's earlier observation (Benassy 1982 ) that uniform rationing of a single commodity prevents the strategic inflation of individual demands, Sprumont
Overview of the results
After reviewing the literature in Section 3, we define the model in Section 4. A onedimensional problem consists of the set N of agents and the set X of feasible allocation profiles: it is a closed convex subset of R N . Agent i has single-peaked preferences over the projection X i of X onto his coordinate.
Two standard notions of prior-free incentive compatibility are defined in Section 5: strategyproofness (SP) prevents individual strategic misreport, while strong group-strategyproofness (SGSP) rules out coordinated moves by a group of agents and guarantees nonbossiness to boot. Under single-peaked preferences we expect a groupstrategyproof revelation rule to be also peak-only: it only elicits individual peak allocations and ignores preferences across the peak. This is true in our general model provided the rule is continuous in the reports (Lemma 1).
The well known fixed priority mechanisms are, as usual, both efficient and SGSP. Therefore, the point of our main result is to provide a fair mechanism that achieves these properties. We define three fairness requirements in Section 6. Symmetry (horizontal equity) says that the rule must respect the symmetries between agents: if a permutation σ of the agents leaves X invariant, then relabeling agents according to σ will simply permute their allocations. Next, no envy says that if X is invariant by permuting i and j, then i weakly prefers her own allocation x i to j's allocation x j . Finally, given any benchmark allocation ω in X, the ω-guarantee property requires each agent i to weakly prefer her allocation x i to ω i . As long as ω respects the symmetries of X, all three requirements are compatible.
We state the main result in Section 7. Given any symmetric allocation ω in X, we define the uniform-gains rule f ω that selects the allocation in X where the profile of gains from ω i toward the peak p i maximizes the leximin ordering. This peak-only direct revelation mechanism is efficient, SGSP, symmetric, envy-free, and guarantees ω; it is also continuous if X is either a polytope (a finite intersection of half-spaces) or strictly convex and of dimension n.
Sections 8 and 9 provide some insights into the structure of the set of efficient symmetric rules meeting SGSP: we call such rules focal. In particular, we ask whether the set of rules f ω uncovered in the Theorem 1 exhausts all focal rules. With the exception of two-person problems and of a family of problems generalizing Sprumont's model, the answer is "no."
In Section 8 we consider fully symmetric problems, i.e., such that X is invariant by all permutations of the agents. This implies X is of dimension 1, n − 1, or n.
Voting problems are those where X is of dimension 1. The uniform gains rule f ω is but one of many more generalized median rules, 1 i.e., the most strongly biased in favor of the status quo outcome ω: so as to elect another outcome, all individual peaks must be to the right of ω (or all to its left), and then the rule selects the peak closest to ω (Proposition 1).
When X is symmetric and of dimension n − 1 the sum N x i must be constant so we can interpret X as a generalized division problem: the original nondisposable division model is the instance where the only additional constraint is the nonnegativity of shares. There is only one symmetric allocation ω, and the uniform gains rule f ω is the unique continuous focal rule (Proposition 2). This result applies to a much larger class of problems than Sprumont's characterization (Sprumont 1991 , Ching 1994 . However, it requires more properties: SGSP in lieu of SP, and continuity.
If X is of dimension n, the set of focal rules is of infinite dimension if n ≥ 3, but if n = 2, it coincides with the one-dimensional family f ω parametrized by ω (Proposition 3).
Finally Section 9 explains why, when the set X of feasible allocations is not fully symmetric, we expect the set of focal rules (they must still respect the partial symmetries of X) to be extremely large even if X is of dimension 2. We use a very simple threeperson workload division problem to make this point. Workers i = 1 2 each bring some amount x i of input, and worker 3 must process the total output; the feasibility constraint is x 3 = x 1 + x 2 . Symmetry rules out discrimination between workers 1 and 2, but it imposes no restriction to the relative treatment of 3 versus 1 and 2. We describe three quite different subfamilies of focal rules, corresponding to sharply different power distributions between the players. Even in such a simple problem, the full menu of focal rules is worthy of further research.
After some concluding comments in Section 10, Section 11 collects the proofs of the Theorem 1 and Propositions 2 and 3.
Related literature
There is a folk impossibility result about the design of (prior-free) strategyproof mechanisms: in economies where agents consume two or more commodities, a strategyproof mechanism must be either inefficient, grossly unfair, or both. To mention only a few salient contributions to this theme, Hurwicz conjectured (Hurwicz 1972) and then Zhou proved (Zhou 1991 ) that the strategyproof and efficient allocation of private goods cannot guarantee "voluntary trade" (everyone weakly improves upon his initial endowment ω i : see the ω-guarantee axiom in Section 6); it cannot treat agents symmetrically either (Serizawa 2002) . In abstract quasi-linear economies, no strategyproof mechanism can be efficient (Green and Laffont 1977) ; ditto in public good economies (Barberà and Jackson 1994) . And the related, more general, concept of ex post implementation hits similar impossibility walls when individual allocations are of dimension 2 or more (Jehiel et al. 2006) .
By contrast we show a broad possibility result in economies where each agent consumes a unique divisible commodity, possibly a different commodity for different agents.
After the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, a substantial literature on voting rules looked for restrictions to the domain of preferences eschewing the impossibility. The single-peaked domain was extended in a variety of ways. If outcomes are arranged on a tree, the Condorcet winner still defines a focal voting rule (Demange 1982) . If outcomes are a product of lines, there is a natural extension of single-peakedness in which coordinate-wise majority still yields a strategyproof and symmetric rule, though efficiency is replaced by the much weaker unanimity property 2 (Barberà et al. 1991 (Barberà et al. , 1993 (Barberà et al. , 1997b , another instance of the "no rule is perfect in dimension 2 or more" result. Trees and products of lines are special cases of abstract convex sets, where we have a general characterization of strategyproof rules Puppe 2007a, 2007b) .
Still in the voting context, recent results provide an endogenous characterization of (a generalization of) single-peaked domains by the fact that we can find strategyproof peak-only voting rules that are symmetric and unanimous (Bogomolnaia 1998 , Chatterji et al. 2013 , Chatterji and Massó 2015 . Following Sprumont's result, the nondisposable division problem received much attention as well. On the one hand, if viewed as a fair division method, it can be axiomatized in a variety of ways without invoking its incentive compatibility properties; see, for instance, Schummer and Thomson (1997) , Thomson (1994) , and Thomson (1997) . On the other hand, it can be adapted and generalized to a variety of alternative models; for instance, to the random distribution of indivisible units (Hatsumi and Serizawa 2009) or the balancing of supply and demand in one-dimensional economies (Klaus et al. 1998) . A good survey of the literature on strategyproof voting and nondisposable division rules up to 2001 is Barberà (2001) .
More recently the rationing model has been extended to allow multiple resources and bipartite constraints (Bochet et al. 2013) , and so has the supply and demand balancing model (Bochet et al. 2012, Chandramouli and Sethuraman 2011) .
If we drop the fairness requirement in Sprumont's nondisposable division problem, there is an infinite dimensional set of efficient and strategyproof division rules: Barberà et al. (1997a) , Moulin (1999) , Ehlers (2002) . See also the discussion of asymmetric rules in the bipartite rationing (Flores-Szwagrzak 2017) and supply-demand (FloresSzwagrzak 2012) models. The same is true in our general model. However the strength of our Proposition 3 is that we find an infinite dimensional set of fair (symmetric) rules even when the feasible set is fully symmetric.
In modern welfare economics the leximin ordering was introduced by Sen (Sen 1970 ) as a tool to implement Rawls' egalitarian program. Maximizing this ordering is sometimes called practical egalitarianism, as it guarantees efficiency while deviating as little as possible from the ideal of full equality of welfares. This ordering was axiomatized first as a social welfare ordering (Hammond 1976, d'Aspremont and Gevers 1977) and then as an axiomatic bargaining solution (Imai 1983 , Thomson and Lensberg 1989 , Chun and Peters 1989 . It also plays a key role in the recent design of good mechanisms for two problems: the assignment of objects when preferences are dichotomous 3 (Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2004) , and the fair division of multiple divisible commodities when all agents have Leontief preferences (Ghodsi et al. 2011, Li and Xue 2013) . See also the generalization of these two results in Kurokawa et al. (2015) .
The model and some examples
The finite set of agents is N and n = |N|. An allocation profile is x = (x i ) i∈N ∈ R N . The set of feasible allocations is a closed subset X of R N . The projection X i of X on the ith coordinate is the set of agent i's feasible allocations; the cartesian product of these closed sets is X N = i∈N X i . Agent i's preferences i are single-peaked over X i if (i) there is some p i ∈ X i -the peak-that i ranks strictly above any other, (ii) i increases strictly with x i on X i ∩ ]−∞ p i ] and decreases strictly on X i ∩ [p i +∞ [, and (iii) i is continuous. Note that in all our results the set X i is convex, and in that case single-peakedness simply means that i is strictly convex and continuous.
We write SP(X i ) for the set of such preferences, and write the domain of preferences profiles as SP(X N ) = i∈N SP(X i ). A preference profile is = ( i ) i∈N ∈ SP(X N ), and p = (p i ) i∈N ∈ X N is a profile of individual peaks. Definition 1. A one-dimensional allocation problem is a triple (N X ) where X is closed in R N and ∈ SP(X N ).
Definition 2. Fixing the pair (N X), a rule (aka a revelation mechanism) is a (singlevalued) mapping F choosing a feasible allocation for each allocation problem
A rule F is peak-only if it is described by a (single-valued) mapping f : X N → X written as f (p) = x such that for all ∈ SP(X N ) with profile of peaks p ∈ X N we have F( ) = f (p).
A peak-only rule is a particularly simple direct revelation mechanism because participants only need to report their peak, so an agent does not even need to figure out how she compares allocations across her peak.
Example 1 (Voting). Here the feasible set is a closed interval of the diagonal = {x ∈ R N |x i = x j for all i j ∈ N}. ♦ Example 2 (Nondisposable division (Sprumont 1991) ). The feasible set is the simplex X = {x ∈ R N |x ≥ 0 and i∈N x i = 1}. ♦ Example 2 * (Bipartite rationing (Bochet et al. 2013 , Flores-Szwagrzak 2017 ). Here we have a set A of partially heterogenous resources and we must distribute the amount r a of resource a among agents in N. Compatibility constraints prevent some agents from consuming certain resources: for instance, a is a type of job requiring certain skills and agent i's skills allow him to do only some of the jobs (see Bochet et al. 2013 for more examples). Formally agent i can only consume a subset θ(i) of the resources (and each resource can be consumed by at least one agent). If y ia is how much i consumes of resource a, the feasibility constraints are
All resources that agent i can consume are perfect substitutes for her: she cares only about her total share x i = a y ia , over which her preferences are single-peaked. The constraints (1) generate a convex compact set of matrices [y ia ], so the corresponding set of vectors (x i ) i∈N covers a convex compact X ⊂ R N . ♦ Example 3 (Balancing demand and supply). This is the problem, closely related to Example 2, where each agent i can be a supplier or a demander of the nondisposable commodity. Normalizing initial endowments at zero and ignoring bankruptcy constraints, we get the feasible set X = {x ∈ R N | i∈N x i = 0}. If p i < 0 (resp. p i > 0), agent i wishes to be a net supplier (resp. demander) of the commodity. Here the familiar voluntary trade requirement corresponds to the ω-guarantee axiom below where ω = 0 is the no-trade outcome. ♦ Example 3 * (Bipartite demand-supply (Bochet et al. 2012 , Flores-Szwagrzak 2012 ). This is a variant of Example 3 where transfers between two given agents may or may not be feasible, and such constraints are described by an arbitrary graph with agents on the vertices. We omit the formal description for brevity. ♦ Example 4 (Bilateral workload). We have a fixed partition of N as L ∪ R, and we set X = {x ∈ R N |x ≥ 0 and i∈L x i = j∈R x j }. We think of two teams L and R who choose individual workloads x k and must coordinate the total workload across the two teams (as in a production chain where R is upstream of L). If R consists of a single "manager," this is a moneyless version of the principal-agent problem, where the principal wishes to adjust total output to his own target level, while the workers' individual targets should also be taken into account (the manager is no dictator). This modifies Example 3 because the role of agents as suppliers or demanders is fixed exogenously; moreover, voluntariness of trade is not assumed. As a result, we show in Section 9 that the set of focal rules becomes much larger. ♦ Our last example is one where the feasible set is of dimension n.
Example 5 (Location). Initially the agents live at 0; they wish to locate somewhere on the real line. The stand alone cost of moving agent i to location x i is x 2 i , and in addition there are externalities-positive or negative-to locate x i near x j . The agents share a total relocation budget of 1. Formally,
where −2/(n − 1) < π < 2 ensures that X is convex and compact. ♦
The externality factor π is positive if there are economies of scale in building two nearby homes; it is negative if two nearby homes must be isolated from one another, e.g., for privacy.
If π = 0, we interpret 0 as the default level of the parameter x i , which is costly to adjust up or down, and there is a cap on total expense: think of temperature in a row of offices, or the carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions of the different plants of the firm.
Efficiency and incentives
Definition 3. The rule F at (N X) is efficient (EFF) if for any ∈ SP(X N ), the allocation x = F( ) is Pareto optimal at . 4 The rule F at (N X) is continuous (CONT) if F is continuous for the topology of the closed convergence 5 in SP(X N ).
We let the reader check that if F is peak-only and represented by f , it is continuous if and only if f is continuous in R N .
Next we define three increasingly more demanding versions of incentive compatibility. Fixing (N X), a profile of preferences ∈ SP(X N ), and a coalition M ⊆ N, we say
. We say that M can weakly misreport at if under the same premises we have x i i x i for all i ∈ M and at least one is a strict preference.
Definition 4. The rule F is strategyproof (SP) if no single agent can misreport at any profile in SP(X N ).
The rule F is group-strategyproof (GSP) if no coalition can misreport at any profile in SP(X N ).
The rule F is strongly group-strategyproof (SGSP) if no coalition can weakly misreport at any profile in SP(X N ).
In general GSP (or SGSP) is considerably stronger than SP, the voting problem being an exception. 6 We recall two well known facts that are useful below. Lemma 1. Fix (N X) and a rule F at (N X) strongly group-strategyproof and continuous. Then F is peak-only; moreover, the mapping p → f (p) representing F is weakly increasing and "uncompromising": for all p ∈ X N and all i ∈ N,
4 There is no y ∈ X such that y i i x i for all i, with at least one strict preference. Proof. For peak-onlyness we fix i ∈ N and
and derive a contradiction. By SP the peak p i must be strictly between x 1 i and x 2 i , else agent i can misreport at one of
is connected so it contains p i and this yields a profitable misreport at both
, an agent's allocation depends only upon her own reported peak. Now assume F j ( 1
by the previous argument and SGSP, agent j is indifferent between these two allocations; therefore, the peak p j is in ]x 1 j x 2 j [. Now we can move continuously from 1 i to 2 i while keeping the same peak p i ; the range of x j contains p j so that coalition {i j} can weakly misreport at
. This is a contradiction of SGSP so we conclude F( 1
. Peak-onlyness is now clear. Next to uncompromisingness. The standard proof that f i (p i p −i ) = f i (p) under the premises of the implication is omitted for brevity. Just as above, we go from there to
It is a folk result that a fixed priority rule (also called serial dictatorship) is both efficient and group-strategyproof. In our model define the slice of X at
it is closed and possibly empty. Given the priority ordering 1 2 , the rule gives peak p 1 to agent 1 (this is feasible by definition of X 1 ), then gives to agent 2 his best allocation x 2 in (the projection on the second coordinate of) X[p 1 ], then next gives to agent 3 her best allocation x 3 in (the projection on the third coordinate of ) X[(p 1 x 2 )], and so on. If X is convex each step is well defined as we maximize a single-peaked preference in a closed real interval. The rule is peak-only, efficient, and strongly group-strategyproof (instead of just GSP). It is continuous as well if X is either a polytope or strictly convex and of full dimension (the proof is similar to that in Steps 8, 9, and 10 in Section 11.1). 7 The strength of our Theorem 1 is to achieve all the properties in Definitions 3 and 4 by a rule treating the participants fairly.
Fairness
In our model the feasible set X may not treat all agents symmetrically, so the familiar horizontal equity property needs to be adjusted with the help of a few definitions.
Let S(N) be the set of all permutations σ of N. Permuting coordinates according to σ changes x to x σ = (x σ(i) ) i∈N and to σ = ( σ(i) ) i∈N . We call σ ∈ S(N) a symmetry of X if X σ = X, and write their set S(N X). We call ω a symmetric element of X if ω ∈ X and ω σ = ω for all σ ∈ S(N X). We say that X is fully symmetric if S(N X) = S(N).
In Examples 1, 2, 3, and 5, the set X is fully symmetric; in Example 4, S(N Z) contains the permutations leaving both L and R unchanged, but not those swapping agents between the two groups. Similarly in Examples 2 * and 3 * , the set S(N X) corresponds to the symmetries of the bipartite graph of compatibilities.
Of special interest are the simple permutations τ ij exchanging i and j while leaving all other coordinates constant. If τ ij is a symmetry of X, we think of agents i and j as having identical opportunities in X, and the no envy test where i compare his allocation to j's allocation is meaningful.
Definition 5. Given (N X), the rule F meets symmetry (SYM) if we have F( ) = x =⇒ F( σ ) = x σ for every σ ∈ S(N X).
Given (N X), the rule F meets no envy (NE) if whenever τ ij ∈ S(N X) and F( ) = x we have x i i x j .
Given an allocation ω ∈ X, the rule
As in axiomatic bargaining, the ω-G property views ω as a default option (e.g., status quo ante) that each agent can revert to.
The three fairness axioms are not logically connected to one another. They have most bite when the problem (N X) is fully symmetric: all agents have the same feasible set X i and no envy applies to every pair of agents.
The affine subspace H[X] spanned by X is the set of vectors λx + (1 − λ)y, where x y ∈ X and λ ∈ R. If X is fully symmetric, so is H[X], and if X is not a singleton, H[X] is of dimension at least 1. It is easy to check that there are only three types of fully symmetric affine subspaces:
• A(n − 1)-dimensional subspace orthogonal to D (Examples 2 and 3).
• The full space R N (Example 5).
As usual the dimension of X is defined as that of H[X].
Main result: The uniform gains rules
We pick an arbitrary ω in X, not necessarily symmetric. So as to define the uniform gains rule f ω , we need a couple of definitions and some notation.
Recall that the leximin ordering lxmin of R N is a symmetric version of the lexicographic ordering lexic of R n . For any x y ∈ R N we set
where x * ∈ R n has the same set of coordinates as x (including possible repetitions) rearranged increasingly: min N x i = x * 1 ≤ x * 2 ≤ · · · ≤ x * n = max N x i . It is well known that lxmin is an ordering (complete, transitive) of R N with convex upper contours, but is discontinuous and cannot be represented by a utility function. Over a compact set its maximum always exists but may not be unique; however, its maximum over a convex compact set is unique. 8 In R N we use the notation [a b] def = {x| min{a i b i } ≤ x i ≤ max{a i b i } for all i} and |a| = (|a i |) i∈N . Given a profile of peaks p, the rule f ω chooses an allocation x in [ω p]. The vector |x − ω| is the profile of gains from the benchmark ω, when we measure each ordinal welfare gain as |x i − ω i |. The rule equalizes gains across agents as much as permitted by feasibility,
where
The allocation f ω (p) is well defined because (ω p) is convex and compact, so the maximum of lxmin exists and is unique. We write F ={f ω } for the set of rules thus constructed. Theorem 1. Fix (N X) and a symmetric allocation ω in X. If X is closed and convex in R N the (peak-only) uniform gains rule f ω ∈ F is efficient, symmetric, envy-free, strongly group-strategyproof, and ω-guaranteed.
This rule is also continuous if n = 2 or if n ≥ 3 and either X is a polytope, or X is strictly convex and of dimension n.
The proof is given in Section 11.1. There we show first that for any choice of ω, symmetric or not, f ω meets EFF and SGSP, and obviously ω-G. It is then easy to check SYM when ω is symmetric in X, and NE when τ ij is a symmetry of X. The proof of continuity when X is a polytope or is strictly convex and full dimensional takes more work: see Steps 8 and 9 of the proof. In Step 10 we also provide an example where X is convex and f ω is discontinuous. Note that Theorem 1 implies that f ω is continuous for all examples in Section 4.
The convexity of X is a sufficient condition for the existence of a focal rule (nonenvious as well), but it is by no means a necessary condition. Remark 3 in Section 8.3 gives a two-person example of a focal rule where X is not convex in R 2 . Remark 1. Alternatively, for some nonconvex sets Xeven efficiency, strategyproofness, and continuity are incompatible. Figure 1 explains this in a two-person example. Assume such a rule F exists and fix a profile = ( 1 2 ) with profile of peaks p. If agent 1 reports 1 with peak c 1 instead of p 1 , while agent 2 reports 2 , then EFF implies F( 1 2 ) = c. Thus agent 1 can achieve c 1 as well as d 1 by a similar argument. Set F 1 ( ) = x 1 and assume x 1 > p 1 : then there is a preference * 1 with peak p 1 ranking c 1 above x 1 . But by SP and CONT an agent's allocation depends only on her own reported peak; 9 therefore F 1 ( * 1 2 ) = x 1 while F 1 ( 1 2 ) = c 1 and agent 1 can misreport. Inequality x 1 < p 1 is similarly impossible, so we conclude F 1 ( ) = p 1 . The same argument for agent 2 gives F 2 ( ) = p 2 and we reach a contradiction. Remark 2. The rule f ω measures all individual welfare gains as |x i − ω i |. If we are not imposing either SYM or NE, we can use a different cardinalization for each i, for instance, λ i |x i − ω i | (where λ i > 0) and get a rule meeting EFF, SGSP, and CONT (the latter with the same qualifications as in the theorem). In the proof of Proposition 3 (Section 11.3) we use a more subtle alternative cardinalization respecting SYM and NE, where "gains" (x i − ω i > 0) and "losses" (x i − ω i < 0) are treated differently. This is how we show that F is typically much smaller than the set G of focal rules.
In the next section, we focus on the comparison of F and G when X is fully symmetric, hence of dimension 1, n − 1, or n. If dim(X) = 1, F is a one-dimensional subset of the (n − 1)-dimensional G (Proposition 1). If dim(X) = n − 1, F and G coincide and contain a single rule (Proposition 2). If dim(X) = n, G is of infinite dimension while F remains one-dimensional (Proposition 3).
8. Application to fully symmetric problems
This is Example 1. Let X 0 be the set of individual allocations common to all agents: a peak-only rule f is simply a mapping from X N 0 into X 0 . Any allocation ω ∈ X ⊆ D is symmetric: ω i = ω 0 ∈ X 0 for all i. To read definition (3), fix a profile of peaks p ∈ X N 0 and some x ∈ X ∩ [ω p] such that x i = x 0 for all i. If there are agents i, j such that
We just proved the following proposition. Proposition 1. Given (N X 0 ) and ω 0 ∈ X 0 , the uniform gains rule f ω defined by (3) is
We have known for decades that a voting rule in (N X 0 ) is efficient, symmetric, and strategyproof if and only if it is a generalized median rule (Moulin 1980 , Sprumont 1995 . Such a rule is defined by the choice of (n − 1) arbitrary parameters q k in X 0 , 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1, interpreted as fixed ballots. 10 It picks the median of the fixed and the live ballots:
(It also meets SGSP and CONT.) The rule f ω is the instance where all n − 1 fixed ballots q k are the status quo ω 0 .
Note that if n = 2, every generalized median rule is also a uniform gains rule; therefore, the family of uniform gains rules {f ω |ω 0 ∈ X 0 } is characterized by the combination of efficiency, symmetry, and strategyproofness. 11 This is no longer true for n ≥ 3, where the set G of generalized median rules is of dimension (n − 1) while F is one dimensional.
Here H[X] is orthogonal to the diagonal D of R N and X takes the form X = { N x i = β} ∩ C, where β is a real number and C is convex, closed, fully symmetric, and of dimension n. Equal split is the only symmetric point in X: ω i = (1/n)β for each i.
Example 6 (Nondisposable division, X = {x ≥ 0 N x i = 1}). Here f ω is precisely Sprumont's uniform rationing rule ϕ, a fact that requires some explanation because the original definition in Sprumont (1991) of the rule ϕ is different. ♦
The key fact is that an efficient allocation must be "one-sided." Assume excess demand at p, i.e., N p i > 1: then the allocation x ∈ X is efficient if and only if x i ≤ p i for all i. And ϕ(p) is the most egalitarian efficient allocation; it is the only one in X that can be written as ϕ i (p) = min{λ p i } for all i, for some parameter λ ∈ [0 1]. To check ϕ(p) = f ω (p) (where ω i = 1/n for all i), we partition N as N − ∪ N + , where p i ≤ 1/n in N − and p i ≥ 1/n in N + (assigning agents such that p i = 1/n arbitrarily). Then excess demand implies
Therefore, the maximum z of lxmin in (ω p) has z i = |p i − 1/n| in N − and z j = min{μ |p j − 1/n|} in N + for some μ ≥ 0. The corresponding feasible allocation x = f ω (p) is x i = min{μ + 1/n p i } for all i, and ϕ(p) = f ω (p) follows.
Next
This new interpretation of the uniform rule stresses the fact that an agent requesting her fair share of the resources (p i = 1/n) is guaranteed to receive exactly that much.
Example 2 * (Bipartite rationing). Recall that allocation x is feasible if and only if x i = A y ia for some matrix of transfers [y ia ] such that y ia > 0 =⇒ a ∈ θ(i) and i y ia = r a for all a. A fully egalitarian allocation (x i = x j for all i, j) is typically not feasible, but there is a canonical "most egalitarian" allocation ω that Lorenz dominates any other feasible allocation x: ω * 1 ≥ x * 1 , ω * 1 + ω * 2 ≥ x * 1 + x * 2 , and so on. 12 Clearly ω is symmetric and f ω is the most natural choice of a uniform gains rule. ♦
Mimicking the original definition of uniform rationing, we can also choose for each profile of peaks p the allocation ϕ(p) that Lorenz dominates every other efficient allocation x: this rule is defined and axiomatized in Bochet et al. (2013) . It turns out that ϕ guarantees ω as well however, unlike in the simple model of Example 6, the rules ϕ and f ω are in general different.
Here is a three-person two-resource example: N = {A B C}, Q = {a b}; f (A) = f (B) = {a}, f (C) = {a b}, r a = 6, r b = 5. The egalitarian allocation is ω = (3 3 5) and it is chosen by both ϕ and f ω whenever it is efficient. Now for p = (1 6 11) the allocation x is efficient if and only if x A = 1, x B + x C = 10, and x C ≥ 5. Then ϕ(p) = (1 5 5) while f ω (p) = (1 4 6).
Example 7 (Balancing demand and supply, X = {x ∈ R N | N x i = 0}). Here the symmetric default allocation is ω = 0 and f 0 is the well known rule that serves the short side while rationing uniformly the long side. That is, given p we let N + = {i ∈ N|p i > 0} be the set of agents with positive demand, and let N − = {i ∈ N|p i < 0} be the set of those with positive supply. If N + p i > N − |p i |, we have excess demand, and each i ∈ N − (as well as any with p i = 0) gets x i = p i while agents in N + use the uniform rationing rule to divide N − |p i |. And a similar definition applies in case of excess supply. ♦
In the bipartite demand-supply model of Example 3 * , the compatibility constraints ruling out transfers between certain agents complicate the description of feasible and efficient allocations: in particular, the agents who must be rationed at a given profile of peaks may contain both demanders and suppliers. But because trade must be voluntary, the default allocation is still ω = 0 and the rule axiomatized in Bochet et al. (2012) equalizes the net gains of agents who must be rationed. Therefore it is precisely the rule f 0 .
Our next result characterizes the uniform gains rule in all symmetric division problems. 12 The recursive definition of ω is as follows. Let N 1 be the largest solution of λ 1 = min S⊆N a∈θ(S) ra |S|
: then Proposition 2. Fix a fully symmetric division problem (N X), where X = { N x i = β} ∩ C and C is either a polytope or strictly convex and of dimension n. Then the uniform gains rule f ω where ω i = β/n for all i is the unique continuous focal rule (i.e., EFF, SYM, CONT, and SGSP) .
The proof is given in Section 11.2. This result is closely related-but not logically comparable-to the characterization of the uniform rationing rule in Example 2 by the combination of EFF, SYM, and SP (Sprumont 1991 , Ching 1994 . The proof of that result uses critically the fact that efficient allocations must be one-sided as explained in Example 2 above. One-sidedness no longer holds in a general symmetric division problem, which explains why Proposition 2 uses the stronger requirement SGSP and adds CONT. 13 Here is an example where four partners divide 100 shares in a joint venture under the constraint that no two partners own more than 2/3 of the shares: (ii) Assume n ≥ 3 and the closed, convex subset X of R N is symmetric and of dimension n. The set of envy-free focal rules is of infinite dimension (while the set of symmetric uniform gains rules f ω is of dimension 1).
We prove here statement (i) in one instance of Example 5 with two agents, and we explain in Section 11.3 how the argument applies to any full dimensional two-person problem. For statement (ii) we take again a simple three-person instance of Example 5 and construct a new one-dimensional family of continuous focal rules that are simple variants of, and different from, the uniform gains rules. The proof that we can similarly generate an infinite dimensional set of rules meeting all the required axioms is in Section 11.3. 
Statement (i) Consider the two-person problem
Thus we see that for any p outside X that is West of d, East of c, and South of ω, agent 1 gets her peak allocation and, con-ditional on this, x 2 is best for agent 2. Similar arguments in the three other remaining regions complete the description of f ω . Clearly f ω is continuous: in fact for any two-agent problem (N X) with X convex and closed, all rules f ω are continuous. We omit the easy proof for brevity.
We show now that, conversely, any continuous focal rule F is precisely f ω for some ω in the diagonal of X. The proof works by focusing on the choice of F at the four corners of X 12 namely A = (5/3 5/3) in the NE corner, B = (−5/3 5/3) in the NW, and so on. By Lemma 1, F is peak-only so we write it as f . By EFF and SYM, we have f (A) = a, f (C) = c. Now by EFF, f (B) is some point b on the NW frontier of X, and by SYM, f (D) = d obtains from b by exchanging its coordinates. Call ω the intersection of the line bd and the diagonal: we show that f = f ω .
Consider Figure 2 that is neither in X nor in any of these four rectangles. By EFF, f (p) = z is on the frontier of X between y and x. We assume z 1 < x 1 = p 1 and derive a contradiction. By uncompromisingness, we get f (5/3 p 2 ) = f (p) = z; but (5/3 p 2 ) ∈ [D d] so f (5/3 p 2 ) = d, a contradiction. We conclude that f and f ω coincide in the triangular region bordered by [D d] and the SE frontier of X. Finally we repeat this argument in the seven other triangular regions.
Statement (ii) Consider the three-person problem
We define a variant of the uniform gains rule f 0 where we discount losses (from zero) relative to gains (from zero). For any positive λ and real number y, we set |y| λ = y if y ≥ 0, |y| λ = −y/λ if y ≤ 0, and, for z ∈ R 3 , |z| λ is the profile of |z i | λ , i = 1 2 3. Then we define
Note that f λ is symmetric in the sense of Definition 5. Also f 1 is simply the uniform gains rule f 0 . But for λ = 1, the rule f λ is clearly different than f 1 , and f λ (0) = 0 implies that it is different than any rule f ω with ω = 0.
Remark 3. Figure 3 shows a nonconvex feasible set Xwhere the same construction as in the proof of Statement (i) above delivers the rule f ω (still defined by (3)). It goes to show that convexity is not a necessary condition for the existence of a rule meeting all properties in Theorem 1. Note that, unlike in Figure 1 , all horizontal and vertical slices (cross sections) of X are convex. A challenging open question is how to characterize the geometric properties of X for which focal rules exist. The difficulty is to ensure that in (3) the leximin ordering has a unique maximum in (ω p). For instance, take n = 2 and
(the union of two rectangles). Vertical and horizontal slices of X are all convex, yet the leximin ordering has two maxima in (ω p) for any symmetric feasible ω and any p i > 1, i = 1 2.
Theoretical Economics 12 (2017) Figure 3 . A uniform gains rule with non convex set X.
General problems: An embarrassment of riches
For general feasible sets X where SYM may have no bite at all, there are very few cases where can we characterize the entire set of continuous focal rules.
One well known case is when X is of dimension 1: barring trivial cases where some agents are dummies, all sets X i are isomorphic to X and we can interpret the model as a voting problem, to which the general characterization in Moulin (1980) applies (it requires only SP in lieu of SGSP); the set of rules in question can then be of dimension as large as 2 n − 2.
Another simple case is two-person problems, n = 2. Assuming for simplicity that X is compact and not symmetric in the agents, the three properties EFF, CONT, and SGSP characterize a four-dimensional family of rules, constructed by adapting the proof of statement (i) in Proposition 3. The four parameters are the values of the rule at the four corners of the rectangle X 12 . In the typical instance (4) of Example 5, we can choose f (A) = a anywhere on the Northeast frontier of X in Figure 2 , f (B) = b anywhere on its NW frontier, and so on. As in Figure 2 , the rule f maps the entire rectangle [a A] to a , the rectangle [b B] to b , etc.; then the pattern of horizontal and vertical arrows is exactly as in Figure 2 . Generalization to any shape of X and to unbounded sets is easy. Now we show by an example that already for n = 3 and dim(X) = 2, we can expect a complex and interesting set of focal rules. This makes a different point than statement (ii) in Proposition 3, where we construct a large set of focal rules that are mere variants of the canonical uniform gains rule. Here we find instead a menu of genuinely different power-sharing scenarios between the three participants.
Consider the the bilateral workload problem in Example 4, with two agents on one side and one on the other: L = {1 2} and R = {3}. Thus X = {x ∈ R 3 + |x 1 + x 2 = x 3 } is a two-dimensional polytope and the problem (N X) treats agents 1 and 2 symmetrically. Let f be a continuous focal rule. We derive the general structure of f before describing appealing subfamilies.
Fixing p 3 for a while, consider the two-person allocation rule (p 1 p 2 ) → f −3 (p) = (x 1 x 2 ). It meets SGSP, SYM, and CONT. Suppose x 1 < p 1 ≤ p 2 : by Lemma 1, we have
we get x 1 = x 2 . Next x 1 x 2 ∈ ]p 1 p 2 [ is ruled out by EFF because we can push each x i toward p i by the same small amount and keep their sum x 3 constant. Thus the only possible configurations are
Let g t be the two-person uniform gains rule in Proposition 2 applied to Z(t) = {(x 1 x 2 )|x i ≥ 0 and x 1 + x 2 = t}. It is extended to any profile (p 1 p 2 ) in R 2 + as g t (min{p 1 1} min{p 2 1}), which we simply write as g t (p 1 p 2 ). We let the reader check that for any (p 1 p 2 ), the allocation (x 1 x 2 ) = g t (p 1 p 2 ) is the only one in Z(t) meeting (5). Therefore we can write the three-person rule f as
In this way the real-valued function p → f 3 (p) determines f entirely. Symmetry of f means that f 3 is symmetric in p 1 , p 2 . Efficiency amounts to f 3 (p) ∈ [p 1 + p 2 p 3 ]: indeed if x 3 is outside this interval and for instance x 3 < t < p 1 + p 2 p 3 , the allocation (g t (p 1 p 2 ) t) Pareto dominates (g x 3 (p 1 p 2 ) x 3 ); for fixed p 1 , p 2 the mapping p 3 → f 3 (p) must ensure agent 3's truthfulness, which means that it is the projection of p 3 on an interval independent of p 3 . Putting these facts together we get the general form
where J ± are symmetric, continuous functions such that
Of course SGSP imposes some further constraints on J ± . We describe three families of rules where SGSP holds, keeping in mind that they do not exhaust all focal rules f in this very simple allocation problem.
First family of focal rules
Say we want to guarantee the benchmark allocation ω = (α α 2α) ∈ X. This is a a supply-demand model similar to Example 3 between demanders 1 and 2, and supplier 3 where ω is the profile of initial endowments. Then
is the rule giving its peak to the short side and rationing the long side (here J − (p 1 p 2 ) = min{p 1 + p 2 2α} and J + (p 1 p 2 ) = max{p 1 + p 2 2α}). We let the reader check the ω-G property.
The canonical rule f ω also guarantees ω, but proves to be more complicated than the rule (8). Straightforward computations from definition (3) give the following J − and J + in (6):
Thus f ω coincides with (8) if p 1 p 2 ≤ α and if α ≤ p 1 p 2 . But for instance if p 3 < 2α < p 1 + p 2 and p 1 < α < p 2 , then f 3 (p) is smaller with f ω than under rule (8), which may or may not favor agent 3 or agent 1.
Second family of focal rules
We now run a vote between the three agents to determine f 3 (p): thus agent i = 1 2 reports 2p i , because if f 3 (p) = 2p i the uniform rationing rule guarantees x i = p i . The simplest rule is majority voting:
More generally p → f 3 (p) can be any three-person strategyproof voting rule respecting the symmetry between 1 and 2 and ensuring efficiency (7). Such rules take the form f 3 (p) = median min 2p * 1 α max 2p * 2 β p 3
for some constants α, β such that α ≤ β. Note that agent 3 can enforce any x 3 in [α β] while agents 1 and 2 together can only force f 3 (p) below β or above α.
A variant closer to the spirit of the first family is the rule
with α ≤ β. Here agent 3 can also force x 3 anywhere in [2α 2β], while if agent i = 1 2 reports p i ∈ [α β], she guarantees only that
Third family of focal rules
We fix γ δ ≥ 0 and apply the general formula (6) with the functions
For γ = δ = 0, this is the simple majority rule (9). For general parameters γ, δ, the rule gives full power to agents 1 and 2 if their peaks are not too different:
Conclusion
Allocation problems with one-dimensional individual allocations and single-peaked preferences allow much flexibility to the mechanism designer, even under the simultaneous constraints of efficiency, prior-free incentive compatibility, and fairness. Our results make two rather different points about the flexibility in question.
First, Theorem 1 says that Sprumont's uniform rationing rule is a template for constructing a focal rule in any one-dimensional problem provided the feasible set is convex and closed (continuity holds for many sets as well).
Second, the example developed in Section 9 shows that, as soon as X is not fully symmetric, even focal rules respecting its symmetries form a much richer set than the uniform gains rules and their variants (in statement (ii) of Proposition 3).
Proofs

Main theorem
Step 1: The leximin ordering. The leximin ordering lxmin of R N is defined by (2) in Section 7. It is a separable ordering, which means that for any x y ∈ R N and any i ∈ N, {x lxmin y and x i = y i } =⇒ x −i lxmin y −i (where the second inequality is in R N i ). Check now that lxmin has a unique maximum over any convex and compact set C of R N . Suppose instead that x and y are two such maximizers so that x * 1 = y * 1 = a (recall that x * rearranges the coordinates of x increasingly). Compare S = {i ∈ N|x i = a} with T = {j ∈ N|y j = a}: if they are disjoint for all k ∈ N, we have a ≤ min{x k y k } and a < max{x k y k } for all k; this implies min k∈N (x k + y k )/2 > a and contradicts the optimality of x. Thus there is an agent labeled 1 in S ∩ T such that x 1 = y 1 = a. By separability, x −1 and y −1 maximize lxmin in the slice C[a [1] ] and we can proceed by induction on |N|.
The upper contour sets of lxmin are convex (proof omitted) and, in particular, for all u v ∈ R N ,
Throughout the rest of the proof we fix (N X) with X convex and closed.
Step 2: Efficient allocations. Let T be the set of ordered partitions τ = (S 0 S + S − ) of N, where up to two components of τ can be empty (if all three are nonempty, τ is a partition of N). The signature τ = s(y) of y ∈ R N is given by S 0 = {i ∈ N|y i = 0}, S + = {i ∈ N|y i > 0}, and S − = {i ∈ N|y i < 0}. We define a transitive but incomplete ordering on T by
and is the strict component of .
Fixing τ ∈ T , we define the τ-boundary of X as ∂ τ (X) = x ∈ X| for all y y = x and s(y − x) τ =⇒ y / ∈ X Lemma 2. Fix a problem (N X ) with corresponding profile of peaks p ∈ X N . If p ∈ X, then x = p is the only Pareto optimal allocation. If p / ∈ Xthen x ∈ X is Pareto optimal for every profile ∈ i∈N SP(X i ) with peaks p if and only if x ∈ ∂ s(p−x) (X).
Proof. The first statement is clear. Next we fix p / ∈ X and pick x ∈ X such that x / ∈ ∂ s(p−x) (X). There exists y ∈ X x such that s(y − x) s(p − x). This implies y i = x i for each i such that x i = p i , and for all j, y j > x j =⇒ p j > x j and y j < x j =⇒ p j < x j From y = x we see that not both S + and S − are empty at y − x; therefore for ε > 0 small enough, εy + (1 − ε)x stays in X and is a Pareto improvement of x.
Conversely, with p / ∈ X still fixed, we pick x ∈ X that is Pareto inferior to y ∈ X at a profile with those peaks p. Then x i = p i =⇒ y i = x i and y j > x j =⇒ p j > x j ; similarly y j < x j =⇒ p j < x j , so we conclude x / ∈ ∂ s(p−x) (X).
Step 3: Defining f ω . Recall the notation |a| = (|a i |) i∈N and [a b] = {x| min{a i b i } ≤ x i ≤ max{a i b i }}. We fix ω ∈ X and define, for all p ∈ R N ,
This allocation is well defined: for any x ∈ [ω p] we have s(x − ω) s(p − ω) so in [ω p] each |x i − ω i | is either x i − ω i or ω i − x i and the mapping x → |x − ω| is linear and invertible in X ∩ [ω p]; thus its image (ω p) is convex and compact. By Step 1, lxmin has a unique maximum y in (ω p), which comes from a unique x in X ∩ [ω p].
Step 4: f ω is efficient. Fix p and set x = f ω (p). If p ∈ X, then the maximum of lxmin on (ω p) is clearly |p − ω|; therefore x = p as desired. Assume next p / ∈ X: by Lemma 2 we must check x ∈ ∂ s(p−x) (X). Assume to the contrary there exists y ∈ X x such that s(y − x) s(p − x). Then y i = p i whenever x i = p i ; moreover x i < p i =⇒ x i ≤ y i and x i > p i =⇒ x i ≥ y i . Therefore, for ε small enough, y = (1 − ε)x + εy stays in X ∩ [ω p]. For all i we have |y i − ω i | = |y i − x i | + |x i − ω i | ≥ |x i − ω i |, with a strict inequality if y i = x i (which does happen). We conclude that |y − ω| lxmin |x − ω|, a contradiction.
Step 5: f ω is SGSP. We fix ω and show first that f ω meets a coalitional form of uncompromisingness (Lemma 1). For any p p ∈ X N with x = f ω (p) we have
lxmin over (ω p), and is in (ω p ) ⊆ (ω p): hence |x − ω| maximizes lxmin over (ω p ) as well.
Next we fix p ∈ X N with x = f ω (p), and consider a coalition M ⊆ N changing all its reports to p [M] (so p i = p i for all i ∈ M), and such that everyone in M weakly prefers
We claim that this implies x = x. Hence M, as well as any coalition larger than M, cannot weakly misreport at p and we are done.
To prove the claim, consider first an agent i such that p i = ω i . By definition of f ω we have x i = p i , hence x i = x i as well, because agent i's welfare does not decrease at x . So at profile (p [M] p [N M] ) agent i's allocation is x i = p i and uncompromisingness (11) implies that everyone's allocation is unchanged if i reports instead
. Therefore we need only to prove the claim when p i = ω i for all i ∈ M.
For easier reading we assume, without loss of generality, p i > ω i for all i, so that ω i ≤ x i ≤ p i for all i. Next we consider i such that p i ≤ ω i : as i weakly prefers x i to x i (at p i ), this implies x i = x i = ω i and we can again ignore those coordinates and prove the claim when p i > ω i for all i.
We must have p i ≥ x i for all i ∈ M; otherwise x i ≤ p i < x i implies that i is strictly worse off at x . Thus we can partition M as
The coordinate-wise minimum of p and (p [M] 
) and the definition of f ω we get (x − ω) lxmin (x − ω). Applying property (10) to u = x − ω, v = x − ω, and λ = ε, we deduce ((εx + (1 − ε)x) − ω) lxmin (x − ω). Now we claim that for ε positive and small enough, the profile εx + (1 − ε)x is in (ω q). As x = f ω (q), this gives εx + (1 − ε)x = x and the desired conclusion x = x.
To prove the claim, observe that for all i / ∈ M + we have ω i ≤ x i x i ≤ q i by definition of q. Next for i ∈ M + such that x i < p i = q i , we have x i ≤ x i (because i weakly prefers x to x) so the inequalities ω i ≤ εx i + (1 − ε)x i ≤ q i hold for ε strictly positive and small enough; and for i ∈ M + such that x i = p i = q i , we have x i = p i (again because i weakly improves from x to x ) so that εx i + (1 − ε)x i = x i .
Step 6: f ω is symmetric if ω is symmetric in X. Check that a symmetric point always exists. The set S(N; X) of all symmetries of X is a group for the composition of permutations. For an arbitrary element x of X, we set ω = (1/|S(N; X)|)( σ∈S(N;X) x σ ): it is in X because it is convex, and it is symmetric in X by the group properties.
We check that f ω is symmetric if (and only if ) ω is symmetric. For any profile p ∈ X N , we must show f ω (p σ ) = f ω (p) σ whenever σ ∈ S(N; X). As lxmin is a symmetric ordering, we have arg max B σ lxmin = (arg max B lxmin ) σ for any set B where the maximum is unique; moreover if x σ = x, then (ω p σ ) = (ω p) σ .
Step 7: f ω is envy-free. Assume τ ij ∈ S(N X). The desired property x i i x j is clear if p i and p j are on both sides of ω i = ω j because for agent i, allocation x i is on the "good" side of ω i while x j is on the "bad" side. Now assume p i and p j are on the same side of ω i , say p i p j ≥ ω i , and that agent i envies x j : then p i > x i ≥ ω i and x j > x i (x j may be larger or smaller than p i ). We consider several allocations where coordinates other than i, j stay as in x, and for brevity we only mention these two coordinates: e.g., x is simply (x i x j ). By the symmetry assumption, x = (x j x i ) is in X, and by convexity, so is x = ((1 − λ)x i + λx j λx i + (1 − λ)x j ). For λ small enough (in particular below 1/2), the allocation (|x i − ω i | |x j − ω j |) is in (ω p) (recall x i < p i ) and the shift from
is a Pigou-Dalton transfer; hence it improves the leximin ordering.
Step 8: f ω is continuous if n = 2 or n ≥ 3 and X is a polytope or is strictly convex and of dimension n. We apply repeatedly a simple version of Berge's maximum theorem. Let a, b vary in two metric spaces A, B; fix a real-valued function a → g(a) and a compact-valued function b → (b) from B into A. If g is continuous and is hemicontinuous (both upper and lower hemicontinuous), then the real-valued function γ(b) = max{g(a)|a ∈ (b)} is continuous as well.
For any (q p) ∈ (R N + ) 2 we set (q p) = X ∩ [q p] and we postpone to
Step 9 the proof of the following fact: if n = 2 or n ≥ 3 and X is a polytope or is strictly convex and of dimension n, the convex-compact-valued function (q p) → (q p) is hemicontinuous on the closed convex subset of (R N + ) 2 where it is nonempty. Then we show in Step 10 that f ω may not be continuous when n ≥ 3 and X is of dimension n but neither a polytope nor strictly convex.
Define an orthant of R N by fixing the sign of each coordinate: is described by n inequalities x i ≤ 0 or x i ≥ 0, one for each coordinate i. It is enough to show that f ω is continuous when p − ω varies in such an orthant, because the orthants are 2 n closed sets covering R N . Without loss of generality we focus on the orthant = R N + , i.e., we prove continuity for the set of profiles p such that p ≥ ω. Here f ω (p) − ω maximizes lxmin over (X − ω) ∩ [0 p − ω]. Using the normalization ω = 0, this is simply written as
We prove first that the mapping p → f * (p) is continuous. Observe that x → x * is continuous. Then check that the first coordinate of f * ,
is continuous in p: Berge's theorem applies because x → x * 1 is continuous and p → (0 p) is hemicontinuous. With the notation e S for the vector (e S ) i = 1 if i ∈ S and 0 otherwise, we write f * 2 as
It is continuous by Berge's theorem because x → x * 2 is continuous and (f * 1 (p)e N p) is hemicontinuous. Next we write
Here again (f * 1 (p)e i + f * 2 (p)e N i p) is hemicontinuous and hemicontinuity is preserved by union, so the same argument applies. We define similarly f * 4 (p) in terms of the sets (f * 1 (p)e i + f * 2 (p)e j + e N {i j} p) and so on. We omit the details. Thus f * is continuous and we show now that f is too. Fix p ∈ R N + and let p t , t = 1 2 , be a sequence converging to p: if w is a limit point of the sequence f (p t ) (i.e., the limit of one of its subsequences), then w ∈ (0 p) because the graph of is closed. Moreover f * (p t ) converges to w * and to f * (p), by continuity of x → x * and of f * , respectively. Thus w * = f * (p); hence w maximizes lxmin in (0 p) and by Step 1 this unique maximum is f (p).
Step 9: (q p) = [q p] ∩ X is hemicontinuous if n = 2 or n ≥ 3 and X is a polytope or is strictly convex and of dimension n. Upper hemicontinuity is clear because the graph of is closed. We let the reader check lower hemicontinuity when n = 2. Next we assume that X is a polytope and invoke an auxiliary result from the linear programming literature. Consider a polytope-valued function b → H(b) = {x ∈ R m 2 |Ax ≤ b}, where b ∈ R m 1 and A is a fixed m 1 × m 2 matrix. This function is hemicontinuous where it is nonempty (Theorem 14 in Wets 1985) . If X is an intersection of half-spaces, the mapping (q p) → [q p] ∩ X takes the form b → H(b) for b = (−q p b 0 ), where b 0 is a constant vector. Therefore is hemicontinuous as desired.
Finally we assume that X is strictly convex and of dimension n. We fix (q p), an allocation x ∈ [q p] ∩ X, and a sequence (q t p t ) converging to (q p) and such that (q t p t ) = ∅ for all t, and we must construct a sequence x t ∈ [q t p t ] ∩ X converging to x.
Each limit point of an arbitrary sequence in [q t p t ] ∩ X is in [q p] ∩ X; therefore the desired conclusion holds if [q p] ∩ X reduces to {x}. Assume from now on that [q p] ∩ X contains z z = x, and set D = z − x ∞ (the supremum norm). Fix ε > 0 and consider y = (ε/2D)z + (1 − (ε/2D))x, also in [q p] ∩ X: we have y − x ∞ ≤ ε/2, and by the full dimensionality of X there is some η, 0 < η ≤ ε/2, such that y − y ∞ ≤ η =⇒ y ∈ X. For each i the interval [q t i p t i ] converges to [q i p i ] y i ; hence for t large enough,
we choose y i in this intersection for all i and we see that
holds for all t large enough. The construction of the desired sequence is now clear.
Step 10: An example where f ω is discontinuous. We have N = {1 2 3} and X is the cone with origin a = (1 1 2) and for base, we have the two-dimensional disk
That is, x ∈ X if and only if x = a + θ(b − a) for some b ∈ B and θ ≥ 0. It is easy to check that X is also represented by the inequalities
We choose ω = 0 and check that f ω is discontinuous at p = a. 14 By EFF, f ω (a) = a. Consider next p δ = ((1 − δ 2 ) 1/2 1 − δ 2) converging to p for small positive δ. As the segment from ω to (1 1 1) stays in X and 1
is on the boundary of X and raising x 3 any more takes us outside X; hence f ω 3 (p δ ) = 1. We conclude lim δ→0 f ω (p δ ) = (1 1 1) = a.
Proposition 2
Fix X = { N x i = β} ∩ C, where C is fully symmetric, closed, and either a polytope or strictly convex and of dimension n. Recall the only symmetric ω divides β equally.
Step 1. We know from Theorem 1 that f ω meets EFF, SYM, and SGSP. It is also continuous if C is a polytope because X is one too. If C is strictly convex and of dimension n, the set X is strictly convex but certainly not of dimension n so the continuity of f ω requires checking. We can use the argument in Step 8 of the proof of Theorem 1 provided
To check the latter we adapt the argument in the second half of Step 9: we fix (q p), x ∈ [q p] ∩ X, (q t p t ) → t (q p), and we construct x t ∈ [q t p t ] ∩ X converging to x. As above we can assume there is some z = x in [q p] ∩ X, and we construct y = (ε/2D)z + (1 −(ε/2D))x that is in [q p]∩X at distance ε/2 or less from x. By the full dimensionality of C there is some η, 0 < η ≤ ε/2, such that for all y , N y i = β and y − y ∞ ≤ η =⇒ y ∈ C We claim now that for t large enough we can find y in [q t p t ] such that N y i = β and y − y ∞ ≤ η. Then (12) holds and we are done as in Step 9 above.
To prove the claim we partition N as N = N + ∪ N − ∪ N 0 , where
Note that up to two of these sets can be empty, and if, say, y i = q t i , agent i can be placed in N − or N 0 .
14 Given our choices of ω and p, the fact that X is unbounded from below is irrelevant: for instance,
+ works just as well.
From p t i → t p i and y i ≤ p i we see that for t large enough we have y i − p t i ≤ η/n, and similarly q t i − y i ≤ η/n. Now consider y: y i = p t i for i ∈ N + ; y i = q t i for i ∈ N − ; y i = y i for i ∈ N 0 . We assume first N y i < β and construct y with the help of the fact
Indeed if p t i ≤ y i + η for all i ∈ N − ∪ N 0 this follows because [q t p t ] ∩ X = ∅ implies N p t i ≥ β. And if y i + η ≤ p t i for some i, then
By inequality (13) we can raise (e.g., uniformly) y i for each i ∈ N − ∪ N 0 up to y i ≤ min{y i + η p t i } such that N + y i + N − ∪N 0 y i = β. Setting y i = y i in N + completes the definition of y in [q t p t ] ∩ X and at distance at most η from y, as announced in the claim. The case N y i > β is treated similarly by lowering y i in N + ∪ N 0 so as to meet the equality constraint.
In the rest of the proof we fix a continuous focal rule F , i.e., meeting EFF, SYM, CONT, and SGSP. By Lemma 1, F is peak-only so we write it as f .
Step 2. For any p ∈ X N such that x = f (p), and any two agents labeled 1, 2 such that p 1 ≥ p 2 , we claim that there is exactly three possible configurations of their allocations x 1 , x 2 :
The remaining case is x 1 x 2 ∈ [p 1 p 2 ]: we assume the configuration p 1 ≥ x 2 > x 1 ≥ p 2 and derive a contradiction. By SYM the allocation (x 2 x 1 x −1 2 ) is in X and by convexity of X so is ((x 1 + x 2 )/2 (x 1 + x 2 )/2 x −1 2 ): the latter is Pareto superior to f (p), a contradiction.
Step 3. We fix an arbitrary profile p and define N − = {i ∈ N|p i < x i }, N 0 = {i ∈ N|p i = x i }, and N + = {i ∈ N|p i > x i }. By Step 2 and SYM, all i in N − (resp. N + ) have the same allocation α − (resp. α + ). Again by Step 2 and SYM for j ∈ N 0 and i ∈ N − , inequality p j < α − is impossible: so α − ≤ p j for all j ∈ N 0 . A similar argument gives p j ≤ α + for j ∈ N 0 .
We claim that x ∈ X ∩ [ω p]. From α − ≤ x j ≤ α + for all j ∈ N 0 and N x i = β, we see that α − ≤ ω i = β/n ≤ α + ; therefore p i < α − = x i ≤ ω i in N − , and similarly ω i ≤ x i = α + < p i in N + . Finally x i = p i in N 0 .
Thus the allocation x is entirely described by the two numbers α + , α − , where −∞ ≤ α − ≤ β/n ≤ α + ≤ +∞. That is, if p i > α + , agent i gets α + , she gets α − if p i < α − , and she gets p i if α − ≤ p i ≤ α + . Note that α + = +∞ (resp. α − = −∞) only if N + = ∅ (resp. N − = ∅). If p * n ≤ β/n, we have ψ ≡ 0 on [β/n +∞[ so the solutions are α − = β/n and any α + in [β/n +∞[; the corresponding allocation is x = ω. Similarly if β/n ≤ p * 1 , the solutions are α + = β/n, any α − in ]−∞ β/n], and the allocation x = ω again.
If p * 1 < β/n < p * n , then ψ increases strictly from 0 on [β/n p * n ] after which it is constant; and χ is constant up to p * 1 , then decreases strictly to 0 on [p * 1 β/n].
Step 4. We fix p and compare x = f (p) and z = f ω (p). By
Step 1, f ω is a continuous focal rule just like f . Therefore by Steps 2 and 3 above, the allocation z is described just like x by two numbers γ + , γ − solving equation (14). If p * n ≤ β/n or β/n ≤ p * 1 , the solution is unique and we are done. If p * 1 < β/n < p * n and z = x, the monotonicity properties of ψ and χ imply {γ + > α + and γ − < α − } or {γ + < α + and γ − > α − }. In the former case, z is Pareto superior to x and vice versa in the latter case. This is impossible because both rules are efficient.
Proposition 3
Statement (i). We let the reader check that the argument detailed for example (4) applies as well to any convex, compact X symmetric and of dimension 2; the shape of X inside X 12 is the same, except when some of the four corners are actually feasible, but those cases are easy. A similar proof applies to the case where X is unbounded.
Statement (ii).
Here we choose a function θ 0 from R into R + = [0 +∞[ such that its restriction θ − to R − is a decreasing bijection to R + , and its restriction θ + to R + is an increasing bijection to R + . The canonical example used in the construction of f ω is θ 0 (x) = |x|; in the example after Proposition 3 we used θ 0 (x) = x if x > 0 and θ 0 (x) = −x/λ if x < 0.
We construct a family of focal allocation rules for any choice of θ 0 . We write θ(z) = (θ 0 (z i )) i∈N for z ∈ R N . Fixing (N X), a symmetric allocation ω ∈ X, and θ 0 , we define a new rule f ω θ as When θ − (z) = θ + (−z) this definition is exactly the same as (3). Not so otherwise, because θ treats differently a move above the default ω i and one below it. Then we follow step by step the proof of Theorem 1 to show that f ω θ meets precisely the same properties as f ω . The desired conclusion follows because the set of functions θ such that θ − is not the mirror image of θ + is of infinite dimension.
As the range of X ∩ [ω p] by x → θ(x − ω) is a compact set, lxmin reaches its maximum in θ (ω p). To prove uniqueness (despite the fact that this range may not be convex) we mimic the argument in Step 1 of the Theorem 1 proof, and use the same notation. Assume that x, y are two maximizers and that S, T are disjoints, and set a = θ(x) * 1 = θ(y) * 1 : then for all k ∈ N, we have a ≤ min{θ 0 (x k ) θ 0 (y k )} and a < max{θ 0 (x k ) θ 0 (y k )}, implying min k∈N θ 0 ((x + y)/2) k > a and contradicting the optimality of x, y. Therefore S and T must intersect and by the separability of lxmin we can drop this coordinate; the induction proceeds as before.
The proofs of EFF, SGSP, SYM, and NE are exactly as in the proof of Theorem 1, so we do not repeat them.
Continuity is not much harder. We restrict attention first to an arbitrary orthant and to the vectors p such that p − ω ∈ . Because θ treats differently positive and negative deviations from ω, we keep an arbitrary orthant; alternatively, normalizing ω to zero is without loss of generality. We set h(p) = θ(f 0 θ (p)) and prove first that h * is continuous. As θ(x) * 1 is continuous, Berge's theorem tells us that h(p) * 1 = max{θ(x) * 1 |x ∈ (0 p)} is continuous as well. For the next coordinate we can write h(p) * 2 = max θ(x) * 2 |x ∈ (0 p) and θ(x) ≥ h(p) where Berge theorem applies again, so h * 2 is continuous. And so on as in Step 8 of the proof of Theorem 1. Once we know that h * is continuous, we take a converging sequence p t → p as before and w a limit point of f (p t ), i.e., w = lim t f (p t ) for some subsequence t of t (omitting the superscripts in f ). Then θ(f (p t )) * → θ(w) * because θ and x → x * are continuous, and θ(f (p t )) * → θ(f (p)) * by the continuity of h * . Thus θ(f (p)) * = θ(w) * and w ∈ (0 p) by the hemicontinuity of . We conclude that w = f (p) as was to be proved.
